LNG DEVELOPMENT PROPOSALS THREATEN OREGON COMMUNITIES AND ENVIRONMENT

Click here  for a link to an excellent article on the LNG terminal/pipeline proposal and a recent public meeting concerning the project held in Coos Bay

Click here  to read FLOW's comments on the Coos Bay North Spit land sale to the Port of Coos Bay proposed by the BLM (to facilitate LNG terminal development)

Click here to read "LNG foes give feds both barrels" from the Daily Astorian

Click here to read FLOW's scoping comments for the Jordan Cove/pipeline proposal

Liquid Natural Gas (LNG):  ENERGY FIRMS TARGET OREGON

Since late 2004, multiple energy companies have proposed large, controversial liquefied natural gas (LNG) developments along the Lower Columbia River and in Coos Bay.  Currently, five proposals exist in Oregon, each of them generating concern among people who live, work, and recreate in their vicinity.  Here is a brief update on each of the five proposals:

1.    Bradwood Landing LNG (Northern Star Natural Gas).  Bradwood, OR.  Northern Star Natural Gas is expected to file its formal application with FERC very soon.  FLOW and many other citizen groups, environmental organizations, and concerned citizens will file to be intervenors in the FERC process, reserving the right to appeal FERC decisions, if necessary.  FERC continues to accept preliminary comments on Northern Star’s proposal, its resource reports (available on the FERC website, www.ferc.gov), and the possible impacts of the project. 

2.    Jordan Cove LNG (Fort Chicago and  EPD, LLC).  North Spit, Coos Bay, OR.   The project, now majority owned by a Canadian energy company, Fort Chicago, is being pushed forward and promoted heavily by the Port of Coos Bay.  The Port is proposing to purchase a tract of Weyerhauser land on the North Spit and lease part of the property to the Jordan Cove LNG project.  The site occupies the area directly opposite the town of North Bend, and it resides close to the North Bend Airport.  The Jordan Cove Energy Project is expected to file with FERC soon, although it will be beginning the pre-filing process, which takes a minimum of 6 months.

3.    Skipanon LNG LLC (Calpine Corp.).  Warrenton, OR.  This proposal on the Skipanon Peninsula at the mouth of the Columbia River is moving forward through local land use proceedings.  The City of Warrenton tentatively approved rezoning the Skipanon Peninsula on behalf of Calpine’s Skipanon LNG LLC.  Their decision, once final, will likely be appealed to the Land Use Board of Appeals by local LNG opponents.  FLOW filed comments (click here to read) supporting opponents of the Skipanon proposal.  Recently, Calpine has filed for bankruptcy.  Their Skipanon LNG LLC asset may be sold as part of the bankruptcy proceedings, and FLOW will continue to monitor these developments at the mouth of the Columbia River.

4.    Port Westward LNG LLC.  St Helens, OR.  This proposal may file with FERC once the developer gains full control of the property required in the area.  The developer has heavily pressured a local landowner (whose family has owned land in St. Helens for over 100 years), under threat of condemnation by the Port of St. Helens, to sell. 

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FLOW’s Position on LNG:

All of the current LNG proposals are extremely problematic from a public safety, economic and environmental perspective.  Consistent with our mission to promote the health of Oregon’s Waters, we are concerned with the environmental impacts implied by the heavy dredging needed to maintain safe passage for LNG tankers, habitat disturbance in sensitive waterways, and loss of public use and enjoyment of these areas.  Additionally, in the cases of these large LNG developments, concerns for public safety constitute our paramount reason for opposing the projects.  Members of communities targeted for LNG development may be unknowingly or unwillingly subjected to risks associated with a possible accidental or intentional LNG spill and fire.  Because the best available information indicates that LNG should be sited remotely from human populations and because all of the sites will bring LNG vessels close to local populations, we oppose the Oregon LNG proposals as being inconsistent with the public interest. 

Furthermore, the measures necessary to lessen the risk to the public of LNG storage and traffic—particularly closing rivers and bays to non-LNG vessels and securing these areas—constitute an additional burden on residents and visitors.  The economic benefits of LNG are minimal and short-term, and locally the impact of LNG may, in fact, be negative on the economies of the Lower Columbia and Coos Bay.  Our research indicates that, in these areas, introduction of LNG could create a high-risk, heavily secured area that will be unattractive to residents, tourists, and other business.  Regardless of the nation’s alleged “need” for natural gas, LNG development is inequitable due to the disparity in costs and benefits for those who live near proposed sites versus the relatively remote end-users of the energy.

Indeed, the impacts of Oregon’s flirtation with LNG may extend far beyond our coastline and the Lower Columbia River.  As with other types of fossil fuel development, many members of the source communities for LNG may not benefit from exporting this resource to Oregon.  Oregonians, by accepting LNG development, will deepen the state’s dependence on fossil fuel resources that are often exploitatively extracted to the severe detriment of local people and environments that do not receive adequate protection.  The LNG issue transcends NIMBYism (Not in My Back Yard), as these projects not only impact Oregonians negatively, but they also support negative impacts that occur in distant, upstream locations in the LNG supply chain.

(adopted unanimously by FLOW Executive Committee)

For LNG-related questions, please call Dan Serres at 503-890-2441.

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Click here to read FLOW's letter to Oregon U.S. Senator Ron Wyden 1) requesting his sponsorship of a bill that would re-establish state authority over LNG siting, 2) requesting that he asks FERC re-open scoping comments in the Northern Star Natural Gas proposal in Bradwood, Oregon, and (3) requesting that he support that FERC and the U.S. Coast Guard must clarify minimum safety standards for LNG vessels.

Reasons and Resources for Supporting Energy Conservation and Renewable Alternatives to LNG in Oregon:

I.                          Public Safety (see Background, also).

·        The Sandia Report indicates that persons living within one mile of an LNG terminal or vessel face a risk of second degree burns from 30 seconds of exposure to a LNG pool fire.  It  uses as the basis of its analysis a 10 percent release and ignition of a typical LNG cargo, or 3 out of the 30 million gallons in a typical vessel.  This report is used as the basis for risk assessment for LNG terminals and traffic.   Read the Sandia Report here:  http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/storage/lng/sandia_lng_1204.pdfor
www.pstrust.org/library/pdf/sandiareport.pdf

·        Dr. Jerry Havens spoke in Portland and Astoria in mid-August.  Dr. Havens is a professor of chemical engineering at the University of Arkansas, and his research includes hazards associated with chemical spills.  He has supplied comments to FERC regarding a very controversial proposal in Fall River, Massachusetts.  Read his extensive comments on the Fall River DEIS here: (on CD)  Shockingly, despite the expert testimony of Havens and others (including Richard Clarke), the Fall River Weaver’s Cove LNG terminal was approved by FERC.  Read our assessment of why Oregonians should be concerned about FERC’s proclivity for ignoring relevant safety, security, and quality of life concerns. (Fall River Report – on cd).

·        The Congressional Research Service also has produced information regarding LNG safety risks. 

II.                    Lack of Significant Economic Benefit and Disparity in Economic Impacts

III.              Direct Negative Impacts to the Integrity of Oregon’s Waters

Click here to read FLOW's initial comments on the Bradwood Landing LNG receiving terminal proposal

Click here to view a map of the thermal zone for the Jordan Cove Project

Click here for a link to an excellent review of the Jordan Cove LNG proposal from a Coos Bay local

Background:

What is LNG?

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is natural gas that is generally procured abroad, chilled to -259^oF, and shipped at this cooled temperature in tankers 1000 ft in length (approximately the size of an aircraft carrier).  Methane is the main constituent of LNG, with an additional small amount of other hydrocarbons.  In its liquid state, natural gas is a clear, odorless, nontoxic and non-corrosive substance.

Is LNG Safe?

LNG is non-flammable in its liquid state, but it can rapidly expand into its gaseous form when released from its holding tanks. 

1.    Particularly in contact with water, LNG will rapidly transition from a liquid to a gas, and this can yield a physical explosion without combustion (California Energy Commission website). Additionally, at concentrations between 5 % and 15% in air, LNG vapor can burn.

2.    LNG is capable of causing freeze burns because of its extremely cold temperature.  Additionally, exposure to the center of a vapor cloud caused by rapidly re-gasified LNG can cause asphyxiation.

3.    Professor James Fay of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has posited   in several studies that, were an LNG tanker to be ruptured by an accident or terrorist strike, it could rapidly spread out and float on water, creating a pool with an associated vapor cloud directly above it:  “Once ignited, as is very likely when the spill is initiated by a chemical explosion, the floating LNG pool will burn vigorously… Like the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, there exists no relevant industrial experience with fires of this scale from which to project measures for securing public safety.” 

4.    The shipping and receiving of LNG requires large exclusion zones for safety in case of accident or terrorist attack.  These exclusion zones may not be adequate, according to Fay, to ensure the safety of nearby communities in the case of improbable but catastrophic accidents or attacks. The recently-released report from the Sandia National Laboratories on the risks associated with a possible large spill of LNG effectively undermine industry assertions that LNG is completely safe and cannot burn.  Indeed, officials were so worried about the possibility of a terrorist attack on LNG that they shut down the LNG terminal in Boston after 9/11 and during the Democratic National Convention, fearing an attack that would devastate downtown Boston.  Each tanker of LNG carries with it an amount of energy comparable to 50 Hiroshima nuclear bombs.  Moreover, models indicate that a major failure in storage could cause a fire that would result in burns for people up to a mile away. 

Other LNG Considerations

1.    Projected increases in demand for LNG in the U.S., in combination with projected declines in domestic natural gas reserves, are prompting the proposal of new import terminals for LNG in the U.S.  Currently, four terminals are operational and forty-nine are proposed or in planning stages throughout the United States (http://intelligencepress.com/features/lng/terminals/lng_terminals.html)

2.    Exclusion zones are necessary for the safe operation of the terminals and tankers, and these areas may disrupt the operation of fishermen, recreationists, and other members of the local community.  Thermal exclusion zones bar activity near LNG terminals because, were an LNG facililty to fail and spill LNG, the resultant pool fire could threaten human health up to a mile away.  Vapor dispersion exclusion zones are similar, and they regulate activity in an area where rapidly warming LNG could form a vapor cloud, which could then drift and combust if it contacted an ignition source.  (See sample comment letter below for current exclusion zone comment period).

    Additionally, flight paths may be restricted in and out of nearby airports to ensure the safety of tankers and receiving terminals.  Bridge closures are also a possibility, a particularly troubling consideration for the Columbia River proposals.

You can file Comments on the Bradwood Facility on the FERC website. 

        Electronic: http://www.ferc.gov and follow instructions under the “E-Filing” link

        Written: Send original and two copies of letter to

              Magalie R. Salas, Secretary 

              Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

                 888 First St., NE., Room 1A

              Washington, DC 20426.

        *reference Docket No. PF05-10-000 on original and both copies, and label one of the copies to the attention of OEP/DG2E/Gas Branch 3 (PJ-11.3).